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Abstract
Literature on political vigilante groups has centred on the violence and conflict that emanate 
from their activities. This article approaches political vigilante groups as political actors who 
engage in political mobilisation and participation and therewith also contribute to nation 
state building. It explores how such groups participate in Ghana’s democratic governance 
and asks whether violence is an inevitable characteristic. The article builds on individual 
in- depth interviews and focus group discussions with political vigilante group members in 
Kumasi and Tamale in 2019. Findings show that political vigilante “youth” appeared to refer 
primarily to the social position attributed to non- elite groups in the political field. Political 
vigilante groups are multi- faceted in their organisational structures, membership, and ac-
tivities both during electoral campaigns and during governing periods. While some groups 
revert to violence occasionally, the study concludes that political vigilante groups, in enabling 
different voices to be heard, are also contributing to democratic governance.
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Introduction
Since Ghana returned from military rule to democratic governance in 1993, Ghanaians 
have consistently gone to the polls every four years to change or retain government. 
After seven consecutive presidential and parliamentary elections since the beginning of 
the Fourth Republic, Ghana is identified as a beacon of peace for other emerging African 
democracies (Gyekye- Jandoh, 2014). Ghana’s democratic elections in the Fourth 
Republic have succeeded Huntington’s (1993) “turn over test.” Yet Ghana’s relatively 
stable and democratic trajectory is not devoid of violence.
The Ghanaian literature has widely explored the violence that occurs before, during, 
and after elections as ephemeral fading off after elections (Bekoe, 2012; Bob- Milliar, 
2014a, 2014b; Lindberg, 2006). The violence has been attributed to youth groups within 
political parties. These youth groups within political parties are described by public 
opinion, civil societies, and some scholarly works in Ghana as political vigilante groups 
(Asamoah, 2020; Coalition of Domestic Election Observers [CODEO], 2017; Daddieh 
and Bob- Milliar, 2012; Paalo, 2017). We find, however, that political vigilantism in 
Ghana extends beyond the electoral transition period into the governing era (CODEO, 
2017: 1), and includes activities other than violence and supportive of democratic gov-
ernance. Moreover, a closer look at these groups show that “youth” should not be taken 
at face value.
In 2019, during the parliamentary by- election in Ayawaso West constituency in Accra, 
violence occurred and it was attributed to the presence of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
and National Democratic Congress (NDC) political vigilante groups in the polling cen-
tres. In consequence, the President of the Republic of Ghana criminalised political vigi-
lante groups in September 2019 when he signed the Vigilantism and Related Offences 
Bill into law (Afua, 2019).1 The new law draws attention to the dichotomy that exists 
between official disbandment of political vigilantism in Ghana’s democratic governance 
and the lived experiences of political vigilantism within the political field. Given the 
long history in Ghana’s politics, political vigilante groups can be seen as political actors 
with interests in the political field that seemingly cannot be curtailed by bureaucratic 
laws.
Political vigilantism in sub- Saharan Africa has received significant attention in the 
literature, though attention has been largely limited to the violence and their manifestation 
as state failure (Asamoah, 2020; Bob- Milliar, 2014a, 2014b; Pratten, 2008; Rasmussen, 
2020; Smith, 2004). For instance, in the study of vigilante groups in Nigeria, Pratten 
(2008) and Smith (2004) underlined the violence that emanates from the activities of the 
vigilante group called Bakassi Boys. Asamoah (2020) and Daddieh and Bob- Milliar 
(2012), in their work, questioned the sustainability of political vigilantism in Ghana’s 
democracy. Nonetheless, a few studies have explored the non- violent engagements of 
youth groups in the political field. Fleisher (2000) noted that state- sponsored vigilantism 
in Tanzania provided services that were beneficial to both the local community and the 
government. Chisanga (2018) discussed how, in Zambia, youth groups in political parties 
are prepared technically to promote the ideals of their political parties, while Kyei (2020) 
identified the political mobilisation activities of political vigilante groups in Ghana.
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By focusing on the case of Ghana, this research aims to investigate the institutionali-
sation of political vigilantism in Ghana’s democratic governance. Specifically, we seek 
to understand the meanings and motivations that drive political vigilantism in Ghana’s 
political system. In this way, this research contributes towards filling the gap on the 
dynamics and operations of political vigilantism in the process of democratic gover-
nance in Ghana. Moreover, the research questions whether violence is an inevitable 
characteristic of political vigilante groups in the political field, often mentioned as a 
reason to disband such groups in Ghana’s politics, as the law now also stipulates. Thus, 
contrary to the narrative that political vigilantism is detrimental to democratic gover-
nance, we propose that political vigilante groups should be seen as political actors that 
engage in political mobilisation and participation, with potentially constructive contri-
butions to democratic processes. We further argue that the violence created by political 
vigilante groups are, rather than signs of a failed state per se, communicative acts that 
present the voice of the specific excluded social forces in the political field.
In this article, we first proceed by conceptualising the political field and political vig-
ilantism. Subsequently, we contextualise political youth engagement in Ghana’s political 
history, discuss the methods, and then continue with a description of the findings. These 
are followed by the conclusions.
Conceptualising the Political Field and Political Vigilantism
Bourdieu’s (1985) concept of field enables the conceptualisation of a political space 
within which political vigilante groups operate. Bourdieu was interested in understand-
ing the latent interests and struggles that shape the empirical realities of social arenas 
(Swartz, 2012). Field is a central concept in Bourdieu’s theory of practice, in which he 
draws attention to the power relations that are involved in practices (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). The concept of field in Bourdieu’s work refers to a social arena and 
simultaneously a space of conflict and competition within which different actors struggle 
for the accumulation of resources (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 7). The political field 
is likened to a game with players occupying different positions of domination depending 
on the type of resources, or what Bourdieu calls capital, that they possess (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992).
In this article, the field in which power struggles occur is the political field of Ghana’s 
democratic governance. We understand democracy as the participation and representa-
tion of citizens in the governance system of a nation state. Rather than a normative 
concept, we investigate democracy in the first place as experienced in the daily life of the 
different actors in the political field. Democracy is thus seen as constructed, recon-
structed, and negotiated (Hagberg et al., 2018: 14) by the diverse political actors in the 
political field. The actors in the political field are individual activists, political parties, 
small groups within political parties, and political institutions.
Previous studies (Asamoah, 2020; Bob- Milliar, 2014a; Gyampo et al., 2017; 
Rasmussen, 2020) have not reached any consensus as to the understanding of vigilan-
tism. Generally, vigilantism is claimed to be primarily a violent, extra- legal action by a 
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group of persons (Abrahams, 1998). Vigilantism is also identified as a manifestation of 
formal institutional failure (Johnston, 1996: 221; Pratten, 2008; Smith, 2004). Rosenbaum 
and Sederberg (1976) placed vigilantism under the category of establishment violence. 
Others argued that vigilantism concerns an “informal political sector” (Abrahams, 1998: 
76) or informal involvement of neo- traditional actors (Moumouni, 2017) in governance. 
For instance, Moumouni (2017) discussed how so- called vigilante hunters’ associations 
called Dambanga in Benin collaborate with security forces in the fight against crime.
There are different categories of vigilantism depending on the field in which the act 
of vigilantism occurs. It has been argued that political vigilantism needs the existence of 
the state for it to function; as such, political vigilantism cannot exist in a stateless envi-
ronment (Abrahams, 1998: 16). Some have argued that political vigilante groups do not 
fight the state with the aim of creating an autonomous polity, but against marginalisation 
in the distribution of the endowed state resources as promised by modern democracy 
(Caldeira and Holston, 1999). Moreover, political vigilante groups are said to rekindle 
the social contract the state has with its citizens in Hobbesian fashion (Abrahams, 1998; 
Goldstein, 2003). We argue that political vigilantism is a mark of refusal on the part of 
some of the citizenry to accept the political exclusion enforced on them by the state. We 
conceptualise political vigilantism as the activities of political party members or sym-
pathisers aimed at claiming their own political interests or those of their political parties, 
potentially through force and/or violence. Political vigilante groups, we propose, may be 
conceptualised as small groups affiliated with political parties that strive to improve their 
access to resources while operating in the political field.
Contextualising Political Vigilantism in Ghana’s  
Political History
Political youth groups, such as the political vigilante groups, are not new to Ghana’s 
politics. They have their roots in the struggle for independence from colonial rule. 
Particularly J. B. Danquah and Kwame Nkrumah played pivotal roles in the political 
mobilisation of the youth for the formation and strengthening of political parties (Bob- 
Milliar, 2014b). During the Gold Coast era,2 J. B. Danquah’s mobilisation of youth 
groups under one leadership was instrumental in the formation of a new political party. 
The organisation of Youth Conferences was one of the strategies that enabled youth who 
had not attained formal schooling to work together with youth who had been schooled, 
in order to present their grievances to the colonial authorities (Austin, 1961). In 1930, 
Danquah managed to call for the first Youth Conference and from there the second one 
took place in 1938 at Mfantspim School (Austin, 1961). The third Youth Conference 
occurred in Kumasi the following year, during which a permanent organisation was 
formed to oversee the activities of the youth groups in the local assemblies. Forty repre-
sentatives of the quasi- political bodies (Austin, 1961: 279) were brought together on 4 
August 1947, which led to the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). The UGCC, 
with Kwame Nkrumah as the secretary general, was the first political party to be formed 
in the era preceding Ghana’s independence.
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Kwame Nkrumah’s unconventional approach did not go well with the founders and 
the other leaders of the UGCC. In particular, the leadership of the UGCC had problems 
with Kwame Nkrumah’s assumption of responsibility for the violence that took place in 
the 1948 riot. They were also concerned that Kwame Nkrumah had orchestrated the 
formation of the Committee on Youth Organisation (CYO). The CYO was radical in its 
demand for self- government as it had as its slogan “Self Government Now,” whereas the 
UGCC had as its policy “‘self- government in the shortest possible time.” On 12 June 
1949, Kwame Nkrumah broke out from the UGCC and formed a political party called 
the Convention People’s Party (CPP), declaring himself as leader and chairman.
The CPP strategically formed the Veranda Boys, who were youthful, exuberant, and 
devoted to the cause of immediate political freedom. In 1951, Kwame Nkrumah was 
released from prison and was invited to lead the government’s business affairs. Kwame 
Nkrumah’s CPP managed to gain independence for the Gold Coast and changed the 
name to Ghana on 6 March 1957. During the presidency of Kwame Nkrumah, the oppo-
sition political party, the National Liberation Movement, formed the Action Troopers, 
which was a youth wing of that party. The two- party system established during the fight 
for independence has resurfaced throughout the political history of Ghana’s four repub-
lics. The UGCC has transformed into the Danquah–Dombo–Busia tradition, while the 
CPP has established itself as the Nkrumahist tradition. The Fourth Republic has wit-
nessed the winning of presidential elections sometimes by the NPP that traces its history 
to the Danquah–Dombo–Busia tradition and sometimes by the NDC with affiliation to 
the Nkrumahist tradition (Bob- Milliar, 2012). As in the pre- and early post- colonial era, 
these two traditions have youth groups that are currently identified in the political and 
public discourse as political vigilante groups.
Data and Methods
This research seeks to understand the meanings and motivations of the political vigilante 
groups and their activities in Ghana. Given the interest in meanings and motivations, a 
qualitative research approach was adopted. The focus is on political vigilante groups 
associated with the NPP and NDC. Political vigilante groups associated with these polit-
ical parties were selected because they were the only parties with such groups in Ghana 
(Gyampo et al., 2017). The political vigilante groups of the NDC and NPP are concen-
trated mainly in the capital cities of the regions. Tamale in the Northern Region of Ghana 
and Kumasi in the Ashanti Region of Ghana were selected as the sites of data collection, 
as they present the strongholds of the NDC and NPP, respectively. In Tamale, political 
vigilante groups called the Azorka Boys, Aluta Boys, Bawumia Fan Club, Samira Fan 
Club, and the Al Jazeera of the NDC, as well as the Kandahaar Boys of the NPP, were 
interviewed. In Kumasi, the Invincible Force and the Delta Force of the NPP and the 
Task Force of the NDC were interviewed.
The fieldwork, conducted by the first author, took place between the months of August 
and October 2019. It was a period when the Vigilantism and Related Offenses Bill 2019 
in Ghana (Afua, 2019) was passed into law. The law criminalised all acts of vigilantism, 
Africa Spectrum 55(3)326
with emphasis on the activities by political vigilante groups. Moreover, public discourse 
in Ghana on political vigilante groups was not favourable, describing them as dangerous 
and nation wreckers. Consequently, scepticism on the part of the political vigilante 
groups towards anyone who sought to understand their activities in the political field was 
widespread. Aware of these challenges, the authors employed a variety of strategies to 
negotiate access. For some of the political vigilante groups, we gained access through 
the hierarchical structures of the political party to which they were affiliated. Second, 
contacts with some of the groups were made possible through key informants who medi-
ated the access. Lastly, some of the political vigilante groups were directly approached 
at their meeting places, where we explained our research objectives in detail and asked 
for their participation. Our institutional affiliation also played a significant role in 
strengthening the confidence of the research participants in the neutrality of the study 
and the goal of knowledge creation.
In total, forty- two individual interviews took place among individual members of the 
various political vigilante groups. In addition, four focus group discussions were also 
conducted with political vigilante group members. Moreover, in total, eight key infor-
mant interviews were conducted with leaders of the NPP and NDC. Prior to the inter-
views and group discussions, verbal, informed consent was obtained from the research 
participants. Given the political and legal contexts, confidentiality and anonymity of the 
research participants are crucial. All the names attributed to the respondents are pseud-
onyms so as to keep their anonymity.
The data were transcribed verbatim and translated from Dagbani and Asante lan-
guages into English language for uploading onto NVIVO software. The data were disin-
tegrated into manageable patterns, themes, subthemes, and relationships (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2001; Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Merriam, 1998). Analysis was conducted 
by the first and second author collaboratively. The second author contributed to the anal-
ysis and presentation of findings through continuous discussion about the findings and 
their meanings, and by co- authoring the various drafts of the article.
Findings and Discussions
Characteristics of Political Vigilante Group Members
Thirty- seven of the research participants were men and the remaining five were women. 
The gender composition confirms the masculine discourse in the literature on political 
vigilantism (Kwarkye, 2018; Nyabor, 2017), though the five women contest the fact that 
women are absent in the field of political vigilantism.
The age composition of the members of the political vigilante groups interviewed 
varied from as young as eighteen years up till sixty years. Political elites and public 
discourse in Ghana often referred to the studied groups as the “youth wings” of the polit-
ical parties. The variation in age of our research participants, however, calls into ques-
tion the understanding of these groups as “youth groups.” As Ali questioned, “Are we 
boys?” (Tamale, October). While in definitions of “youth” boundaries of the relevant age 
brackets vary across contexts, many resonate with the one put forward by the United 
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Nations, which sees youth as young people between eighteen and thirty- six years old. 
Other definitions of youth signal a period of transition from childhood to adulthood 
(Reis and Berckmoes, 2018) or refer to a specific socio- generational position, often 
related to characteristics of dependency (Christiansen et al., 2006: 9; see also, Abbink 
and Kessel, 2005; Durham, 2000; Honwana and De Boeck, 2005). In the political field 
of Ghana, we found that the term “youth” is applied to indicate the political position of 
a person vis-à-vis more powerful political actors. Those who are not able to enter the 
class of political elites, irrespective of their age, are ascribed the position of youth in the 
political field.
About twenty- one of the respondents had basic education, twelve had secondary edu-
cation, five were pursuing undergraduate education, and four were graduates. Several 
members of the political vigilante groups interviewed explicitly sought to redress the 
general perception that they were individuals without any sense of purpose in life, as is 
the current view in public discourse. In light of this, a research participant stated: “I am 
a professional carpenter and I own my shop with apprentices who work for me. When 
you came earlier on [meeting place], you realised that there was no one here; it was 
because we all have our various professions” (Kwesi, Kumasi, September).
Variation between Political Vigilante Groups
Ghana’s political vigilante groups vary tremendously and are multi- faceted in nature. In 
this research, we identified various themes that highlight characteristics and activities of 
political vigilante groups, which we will discuss below. These regard the duration of 
membership, the organisational structure of the group, the voice that groups have been 
able to secure within the political field, and whether or not a political vigilante group 
employs the use of force or violence in their activities. All these characteristics reflect 
how political vigilante groups perceive and position themselves as political actors in the 
political field. Across the groups interviewed, the characteristics and activities are com-
bined in different ways.
Membership Duration. The first characteristic found to differ across political vigilante 
groups concerns the state and duration of membership. Two main categories are iden-
tified. The first comprises political vigilantes who acknowledge their membership of a 
group within a particular political party. Here, members openly declared and accepted 
the socially ascribed or self- imposed names of political vigilante groups, which were 
linked to either the NPP or the NDC. The following political vigilante groups fell within 
this category: the Kandahar Boys, the Invincible Force, the Delta Force, the Bawumia 
Fan Club, and the Samira Fan Club. In these groups, membership is more or less well 
defined with nominated leaders occupying different formal positions within the groups. 
Among the members, moreover, there appears explicit commitment to the growth of the 
group. The duration of membership is described by members as consistent and lasting, 
as we see in the following quotes:
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I am a member of the Kandahar Boys and I have been with the group since its inception in 
1996. (Ibra, Tamale, October)
We derive our political history from the CPP and PNC then we continued through Chairman 
Rawlings in the NDC at the beginning of the Fourth Republic. We have a membership of 
over 200 and we are registered under the NDC for that is where our roots are. (Bamba, 
Kumasi, September)
This group is NDC and we will forever be NDC otherwise our parents will not forgive us. 
We have a large membership and we keep records of members in the group. (Isak, Tamale, 
October)
In contrast to the members of this first category of political vigilante groups, individ-
uals associated with other political vigilante groups denied affiliation to these groups, 
even though they sometimes assumed the socially ascribed or self- imposed names. Some 
referred to themselves as called- upon individuals who are loyalists to a specific political 
party leader. They explained that they were called upon by their leaders in times of need, 
or “mobilisation on demand.” Because of the temporary attachment, involvement of 
individuals in these groups is sporadic and inconsistent. Loyalists generally do not 
acknowledge their togetherness as a group. Ali shows how such nuanced understanding 
of what “membership” entails can lead to seeming contradictions:
Are we boys? There is nothing like Azorka Boys because anybody who comes to sit here 
is called Azorka Boy.





Ali, to interviewer: We are loyalists of Chairman Azorka but not a group. When the 
Chairman calls and requests for boys, we mobilise from different parts of Tamale and then 
we execute that action. (Ali, Tamale, October)
In other words, the Azorka Boys and other groupings exist at the instance of the 
leader who instructs and directs a few loyalists to mobilise other people for specific 
actions.
Organisational Structure. The second characteristic concerns the organisational struc-
ture of the group within the political party, which was often connected to how long the 
group had been in existence. Our findings reveal that some of the political vigilante 
groups are well organised and well connected to the internal political party structures. 
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The hierarchical structures of these groups have clearly defined internal rules that dictate 
the norms and values of the group. There is a chain of command that descends from 
top to bottom, and in general, members respected the authority; otherwise they risked 
dismissal from the group. Although most of these norms are not written down but shared 
orally, they inform the lived experience of most of the political vigilante groups. For 
example, Enoch narrated how his group was organised and in what way these internal 
structures added to the sense of order and togetherness:
We are familiar with each other and we have our register with the members of the group. 
We have monthly contributions, which we use as a welfare fund. In case of any unforeseen 
contingencies we support any member of good standing with it. The group has the executive 
body and I am the leader of the group. (Enoch, Kumasi, September)
Similarly, Kay described the hierarchy in his group:
In the group we have seniors and juniors. We have to respect our seniors and follow the 
directions that they give. If a junior faults, he or she is dealt with accordingly. We know 
ourselves as members. (Kay, Kumasi, September)
The Aluta Boys and the Kandahar Boys political vigilante groups were also well 
structured and kept records of membership and leadership. From the participant obser-
vation and focus group discussions, especially members of the Aluta Boys, the NDC 
Task Force, and the Delta Force accorded due respect to the leaders. A typical remark 
from members who participated in the (informal) exchanges of our research was “our 
boss has said it all.”
Voice. The longevity of a political vigilante group also affected the group’s adaptabil-
ity to the political field in terms of claiming their interests and making demands. Of the 
above- named groups, for instance, the NDC Task Force started in 1992, the Aluta Boys 
in 2003, the Kandahar in 1996, and the Delta Force in 1999. Below, Adam explains that 
the formation of the group within the NDC party was motivated by the possibilities it 
gave in terms of making claims. Alan, in contrast, explains that they formed a political 
vigilante group to protect voters in their area from threats of opposing groups:
When President Rawlings took the country to democracy, we became interested in politics. 
The best way to let our voices heard or to be recognised was to form a group. Actually we 
were already a group of friends so we only converted it into a political group within the 
NDC. (Adam, Kumasi, September)
In 1992 when multi- party system of governance started, we were in secondary school but 
when we came out and attained the age of voting, we realised that the only way to ensure 
that no one comes to our locality to threaten voters was to form a group and that was how 
we formed the group in 1999 which is affiliated to the NPP. (Alan, Kumasi, September)
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In contrast, the Bawumia Fun Club and the Samira Fan Club were established only 
recently, in 2016. Their level of engagement in governance has been low even though 
their political party is in power. Dan and Ahmed recounted that their groups appear not 
to be recognised by the political party leadership, which affects their ability to benefit 
from the party’s success:
The group started in 2016 with the aim of helping the party win power. We had to register 
with the NPP regional office but I doubt if the leader has done that because I learnt the party 
brought items for the various youth groups but we never had our share because we were 
told our group was not registered. We have not had anything from the party. (Dan, Tamale, 
October)
The group and its members have not received any materials from the party since the party 
got into power. This place is predominantly Muslim and during the period of Ramadan, the 
party can at least send us some food items like sugar to be given to our members as a sign 
of solidarity but that is not done. We have never been consulted. (Ahmed, Tamale, October)
In brief, political vigilante groups that survived over a long period of time often had 
been able to secure a certain position of influence in the political party or in the locality 
they represent.
During and After Elections. One of the activities political vigilante groups mentioned 
as important concerns their involvement in electoral mobilisation. Voting is a fundamen-
tal right in multi- party democracy, and citizens are encouraged to exercise that right, 
although various circumstances may contribute to a lack of motivation among citizens to 
go to the polling stations. For example, in Ghana, practical constraints such as distance 
or transport costs involved in arriving at polling stations may discourage them from 
voting. As such, several research participants mentioned how they facilitated transport 
for voters:
In this city, we have many villages and not all of them have polling stations. We get some 
funds from the party to hire buses to transport persons that we are sure of voting for us to 
the nearest polling centre. You cannot be hundred per cent sure but at least some level of 
trust is maintained. (Moses, Tamale, October)
All the parties do bus people in their strongholds to the polling centres where they regis-
tered so as to provide them the opportunity to elect the right person to lead the country. 
Democracy has come to stay in Ghana and this is our way of mobilising people to be part 
of the process. (Don, Tamale, October)
Another challenge regularly mentioned was the problem of misinformation during elec-
toral campaigns that political vigilante groups sought to address:
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I love NPP and I am not expecting any direct material gains from the party but I want to 
ensure that it governs the country because of their efficient policies. As such during elector-
al periods, we move to the villages to spread the good works that the government is doing 
otherwise the NDC might go and distort the information. (Ado, Kumasi, October)
Another research participant reiterated that:
The NPP government has brought hardships upon the country and the country needs change. 
As a group associated with the NDC, we move from house to house, door to door to present 
the evil that the NPP government is doing for which reason they have to vote for NDC. 
(Dan, Tamale, September)
For political parties, these campaigning activities are critical to reach potential voters. 
Voting of citizens in the nation state is essential as the outcome from the ballot box 
grants political legitimacy to the winner in multi- party system of democracy. That said, 
the competition for voters is sometimes marked by violence and intimidation, which can 
silence or deter some voters from exercising their voting rights. However, such happen-
ings in the Ghanaian electoral period are exceptions rather than the norm.
After electoral periods, political vigilante groups often continued their engagement in 
the political field, for instance through activities of lobbying and advocacy aimed at 
improving living conditions in their area of influence. As such, Ato, Isa, and Kan under-
lined their role in infrastructural development in their neighbourhoods:
The road here is tarred because of the presence of Aluta Boys. We advocated for the con-
struction of roads in our vicinity. (Ato, Tamale, September)
The road here is well constructed because of the lobbies that we made with our Member of 
Parliament and the minister for roads. We have also ensured that our children go to school 
so that they can be like you. Some of our members have gotten scholarships to further their 
education. (Kan, Kumasi, October)
The community toilet is functioning well because of the presence of Aluta Boys. We man-
age the facility and we want to maintain hygiene and promote healthy living so we ensure 
that the place is clean and accessible to all members of the community. We also main-
tain security in our community. It is not possible to steal in our community. (Isa, Tamale, 
September)
To summarise, the political vigilante groups in our research explained how, in a vari-
ety of ways, they are engaged in making their voice and the voices of their constituency 
heard in the political arena, both during and after electoral periods.
Force and/or Violence. An important question concerns the way in which political vig-
ilante groups, given their officially marginalised position in the political field, are able 
to make their voices heard – whether or not through violence. In this regard, some of the 
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political vigilante groups claimed not to have been involved in any forceful acts, while 
others categorised themselves as having applied force or “violence.” Among political 
vigilante groups who claim not to use force or violence, a contradiction in the discourse 
sometimes becomes apparent. In this regard, Bol narrated that while staying away from 
violence, they regularly defend themselves when they are attacked:
We are not violent but if we are attacked, we defend ourselves and that is what normally 
happens. […]. Election is a serious business and our presence at the polling station is to only 
witness that there is transparency. (Bol, Tamale, October)
Randy similarly emphasised the importance of defence and protection:
When our presidential candidate visits Ashanti Region, it is our duty to provide escort to 
him as party faithful. You never know if anybody has bad intentions so we secure his safety 
throughout his stay. At the end of his stay, we escort him until the border of Ashanti Region 
where our territory ends. We do not cause any violence. (Randy, Kumasi, September)
There are also groups who explicitly acknowledge their use of violence. They gave 
three main motivations for violence, which can be classified as related to communal, 
institutional, and livelihood contexts. Our findings suggest that communal motivation 
stems from the inability of the affiliated political party to heed the demands of employ-
ment, political positions, and favours of a political vigilante group and its members. For 
instance, in 2017, the Delta Force stormed the office of the Regional Security Coordinator 
in Ashanti Region and moved him out of office because he was not their preferred can-
didate for the position. They suspected he would not do them the favours they hoped for 
(Nyabor, 2017). Similarly, Ernest recounted how they threatened their party elites when 
those in specific, powerful positions were not living up to the expectations of the politi-
cal vigilante group members or community:
When the behaviour of the Chief Executive Officer of the Tamale Government hospital was 
not pleasing to the residents of Tamale and several appeals to the party executives did not 
yield any results, we protested by locking his office. That was how we demonstrated our 
displeasure and the government acted swiftly afterwards. (Ernest, Tamale, October)
The second motivation is institutional, in that it relates to the position and success of 
the political party with which the political vigilante group identifies. Especially when the 
groups realise that the actions and/or inactions of the political party elites have the ten-
dency to adversely affect the success of the party in the next elections, they may resort 
to the use of force. Martin recounted how they confiscated means to promote their party 
in the electoral campaigns:
During the political campaign preceding the 2016 elections, we needed vehicles to go to the 
villages to campaign for the NDC but the Municipal Chief Executive was not responding to 
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our demand. We therefore stopped him in the middle of the road and moved him out of his 
pickup van and used it for the work of the party. (Martin, Tamale, October)
With regard to livelihood, the research participants seek to benefit from resources that 
help improve their livelihoods when “their party” is in power. Joe narrated that when 
their political party was in power, they benefitted from resources that helped improve 
their livelihoods:
When the NDC was in power, we took about fifty acres of land and we cultivated farm 
produce and we shared the proceeds. We were able to acquire tractors from the Regional 
Coordinating Council to plough and cultivate the land. Last year each person got about 
five bags and that was motivating. The land is for us, not for Azorka, but this year we did 
not farm because our party is not in power and we do not have the tractors. (Joe, Tamale, 
October)
Often, after elections are won, only some livelihood and other interests of vigilante 
groups and their members are fulfilled. To express frustration and anxiety about the lat-
ter, most groups sometimes apply force. In spite of the varying levels of political accom-
plishment, however, most of the research participants explained they would not abandon 
the political field because they were aware that obtaining success requires a struggle.
Importantly, all political vigilante groups in the Ghanaian political field with a strong 
organisational structure interviewed in this study acknowledged having used force or 
violence to achieve specific objectives. In contrast, the less organised groups, in their 
discourse, largely did not acknowledge their application of force, with the exception of 
the Azorka Boys. Yet notably the Azorka Boys also have a long period of existence in the 
political field. It may be that the groups that have a long period of experience in the 
political field are more aware of how the application of force may serve as a bargaining 
tool in negotiating with their political elites. The more newly established groups may be 
less conversant with the rules of the game. Alternatively, the less organised groups, 
given that often they are only to a limited extent recognised by their political party elites, 
may benefit less from protection by their political leaders should negative consequences 
follow (e.g. imprisonment).
Conclusions
The political field is embedded with power relations that inform the accumulation of 
resources or capital of individuals or institutions (Bourdieu, 1985). The boundaries of 
the political field are not fixed but relational, enabling diverse actors to participate in the 
political field (Bourdieu, 1985). As a result, besides the few political elites, “non- 
conventional” individuals and groups, including those in the limelight in this study, also 
participate in the political field. By representing their own interests and those of their 
political parties, we argue that these groups contribute to the strengthening of the nation 
state (cf. Kyei, 2020).
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In Ghana, political vigilante groups have a long history. In the Gold Coast era, 
Kwame Nkrumah’s Verandah Boys were initially ignored and there were even calls for 
the group to be disbanded because they did not fit into the status quo. Kwame Nkrumah 
retorted that when “the CPP were vigorously castigating imperialism and colonialism 
and were struggling to be free, our opponents chose to denounce us as a pack of ‘irre-
sponsible and unruly Verandah boys’” (Nkrumah, 1955: 397). Nonetheless, the 
Verandah Boys prevailed over the political boundaries and found a way to create space 
within the political field. The political vigilante groups of present- day Ghana, like the 
Verandah Boys in the past, engage in political mobilisation especially during electoral 
periods, and resort to other, diverse activities such as lobbying and advocacy in the 
governance period.
In general, the research finds that existing political vigilante groups are complex and 
multi- faceted in nature and activities. Most of the political vigilante groups in this 
research demonstrate having internal organisational structures that are institutionalised 
with individuals entrusted with leadership roles that are endowed with authority. In the 
process of institutionalisation, political organisations acquire value and stability (Tull 
and Simons, 2017) as they adapt to the complex systems within the political field. The 
longer the existence of an organisation, the higher the level of institutionalisation, 
because it has built the capacity over time to withstand crisis. Almost all the political 
vigilante groups we spoke to have survived about five of the seven terms of government 
in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. If Ghana’s democracy is classified as institutionalised and 
stable, then political vigilantism in Ghana is as well.
Ghana’s relatively stable democratic trajectory has succeeded Huntington’s (1993) two- 
turnover test of democratic stability. Yet Ghana is still in the process of strengthening its 
democracy, and the rate of growth of the social forces outgrows the building of political 
institutions. Diverse social forces such as political vigilante groups are now incorporated in 
political parties and they contribute towards the winning of elections. Once the political 
parties enter into government, however, they find it difficult to integrate all these social 
forces into the governance structure. Rapid political decentralisation with the non- 
accompaniment of political inclusion creates tension in the political field, as the field lacks 
the ability to provide proper regulatory boundaries (van Cranenburgh, 2011).
Our research participants translated into their life history the trajectories of Ghana’s 
political history and economy and how they navigate through the complex political field. 
The respondents were a group of agents who did not seek to impose their political will on 
others in order to claim autonomy; rather, they were political actors who struggled to create 
space within the elite- filled political field so as to gain recognition and advance their politi-
cal situation. The members of the political vigilante groups constructed their identity within 
the political field so as to become political beings. Instead of being in a project of “social 
becoming” (Vigh, 2006: 11), as is often said about youth in Africa, this research suggests 
that members of political vigilante groups, often referred to as “youth” irrespective of their 
biological age, are in the project of “political becoming.” Currently in a situation of relative 
dependence on political elites, they seek how their voices can be heard and taken into 
account by participating in the political field.
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For our research participants, membership in political vigilante groups is thus a way 
of escaping the limits imposed by economic, social, and political impediments in the 
political field that are almost impossible to achieve individually. We have argued that 
since political vigilante groups allow political voices otherwise not heard to be taken into 
account in the political field, political vigilantism enhance rather than destroy demo-
cratic governance. In conclusion, given their long history, activities, and motivations, we 
propose that political vigilante groups have become an integral part of modern demo-
cratic governance, at least in Ghana.
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Notes
1. Notably, the passing of Ghana’s Vigilantism and Related Offenses Bill 2019 into law followed 
violence in the by-election in the constituency in Accra, the capital of Ghana. Yet this was not 
the first time violence occurred in the Fourth Republic. Arguably, however, for legal steps to be 
taken, location was fundamental in defining legality and illegality, which brings into the discus-
sion a centre–periphery dichotomy in the discourse on political vigilantism. The political elites 
responded to a political problem that should not have happened in the centre, Accra, which is 
the seat of government and international organisation.
2. Ghana was called Gold Coast during the colonial era, a name given by the British because of 
the endowment of gold in that territory.
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Politische Vigilantengruppen in Ghana: Gewalt oder 
Demokratie?
Zusammenfassung
Die Literatur über politische Vigilantengruppen konzentriert sich auf die Gewalt und 
Konflikte, die von ihren Aktivitäten ausgehen. Dieser Beitrag nähert sich politischen 
Vigilantengruppen als Akteuren, die sich für politische Mobilisierung und Partizipation 
einsetzen und damit auch zum Aufbau eines Nationalstaates beitragen. Er untersucht, 
wie diese Gruppen an demokratischen Prozessen in Ghana beteiligt sind und fragt, ob 
Gewalt ein unvermeidliches Merkmal davon ist. Der Artikel basiert auf ausführlichen 
Interviews und Fokusgruppendiskussionen mit Mitgliedern von Gruppen in Kumasi und 
Tamale aus dem Jahr 2019. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich die politische vigilantis-
tische „Jugend“ in erster Linie auf die soziale Position bezieht, die nichtelitären Gruppen 
im politischen Bereich zugeschrieben wird. Politische Vigilantengruppen zeichnen sich 
sowohl während des Wahlkampfes als auch während der Regierungsperioden durch 
vielfältige Organisationsstrukturen, Mitgliedschaften und Aktivitäten aus. Während ein-
ige Gruppen gelegentlich auf Gewalt zurückgreifen, kommt der Artikel zu dem Schluss, 
dass politische Vigilantengruppen auch zur demokratischen Regierungsführung beitra-
gen, da sie verschiedenen Stimmen Gehör verschaffen.
Schlagwörter
Ghana, politische Vigilantengruppen, politischer Vigantilismus, Demokratie, Jugend
